Taxpayer Favorable Ruling on M&A Acquisition Costs

"Company requests permission to allocate the transaction costs incurred based on the entity to whom the services were rendered and/or on whose behalf the services were provided. Company’s position is that this treatment is appropriate because these entities directly and proximately benefited from the services and incurred the economic burden of these services. Company essentially argues that the proper party to be charged with costs incurred in the Transaction may not be readily identifiable because of the structure of the transaction and the many parties involved."

"It is well established that where a taxpayer undertakes to pay the obligations of another taxpayer, such payments are not deductible as ordinary or necessary business expenses incurred in the taxpayer’s trade or business. See Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940). This is true even where the cost would have been deductible had the taxpayer incurred it. The determination of the appropriate taxpayer is often a question of fact. See Crosby v. United States, 496 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1974)."

"We conclude Company may allocate transaction costs to either Company or Acquisition Co. based upon the entity to which the services were rendered and/or on whose behalf the services were provided."

Full guidance here.

Delaware Chancery M&A Decision, Hexion vs. Huntsman (Del. Ch., Sept. 29, 2008)

"In July 2007, just before the onset of the ongoing crisis affecting the national and international credit markets, two large .... companies entered into a merger agreement contemplating a leveraged cash acquisition of one by the other...."

"Because the buyer and its parent were eager to be the winning bidder in a competitive bidding situation, they agreed to pay a substantially higher price than the competition and to commit to stringent deal terms, including a no “financing out.” In other words, if the financing the buyer arranged (or equivalent alternative financing) is not available at the closing, the buyer is not excused from performing under the contract. In that event, and in the absence of a material adverse effect relating to [Target’s] business as a whole, the issue becomes whether the buyer’s liability to the seller for failing to close the transaction is limited to $325 million by contract or, instead, is uncapped."

"[T]he buyer covenanted that it would use its reasonable best efforts to take all actions and do all things “necessary, proper or advisable” to consummate the financing on the terms it had negotiated with its banks and further covenanted that it would not take any action “that could be reasonably be expected to materially impair, delay or prevent consummation” of such financing....."

"In this post-trial opinion, the court finds that the seller has not suffered a material adverse effect, as defined in the merger agreement, and further concludes that the buyer has knowingly and intentionally breached numerous of its covenants under that contract. Thus, the court will grant the seller’s request for an order specifically enforcing the buyer’s contractual obligations to the extent permitted by the merger agreement itself."

The entire opinion can be found here.

Lear: Strine on No Vote Termination Fees

In  Re Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2008)

"In this case, stockholder plaintiffs seek to hold the board of Lear Corporation (“Lear” or “the company”) responsible in damages for agreeing to pay a bidder a termination fee payable upon a no vote on a merger in exchange for that bidder increasing its bid from the original merger agreement by $1.25 per share (“the Merger”). The bidder did not face competition from a rival bidder; in fact, Lear had been fully shopped, and no topping bid had emerged. Rather, in a frothy M & A market, stockholders perceived that the original merger price of $36 per share was inadequate and that the original bidder could do better. Facing likely defeat on the $36 merger at the polls, the Lear board bargained to get another $1.25 per share. In exchange, the bidder demanded $25 million in compensation contingent solely upon a no vote, in contrast to the original termination fee, the bulk of which was payable only if Lear consummated an alternative transaction within twelve months. The $25 million represented only 0.9% of the total deal value. According to the amended complaint, the Lear board approved the “Revised Merger Agreement” knowing that it was improbable that its stockholders would agree to the enhanced deal. And, in fact, the shareholders did not approve, and the Merger was defeated.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint against them, primarily arguing that the complaint fails to state with particularity a non-exculpated claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In this opinion, I grant that motion. At bottom, the plaintiffs’ theory is that directors who believe in good faith that a merger is good for the stockholders cannot adopt it if stockholder approval is unlikely. That notion is at odds with our law.

Directors are entitled to make good faith business decisions even if the stockholders might disagree with them. Where, as here, the complaint itself indicates that an independent board majority used an adequate process, employed reputable financial, legal, and proxy solicitation experts, and had a substantial basis to conclude a merger was financially fair, the directors cannot be faulted for being disloyal simply because the stockholders ultimately did not agree with their recommendation. In particular, where, as here, the directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision, it is critical that the complaint plead facts suggesting a fair inference that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by making a bad faith decision to approve the merger for reasons inimical to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Where a complaint, as here, does not even create an inference of mere negligence or gross negligence, it certainly does not satisfy the far more difficult task of stating a non-exculpated duty of loyalty claim."

 

Interesting M&A Decision Out of California (9th Circuit Court of Appeals)

"We are asked to decide an issue of first impression under California law, whether a provision within a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) permitting the representations and warranties of the parties to survive closing, also serves as a contractual statute of limitation that reduces a longer period otherwise provided by California law. Because the provision at issue does not unambiguously state the parties’ intent to contractually reduce the applicable California statute of limitation to one year, we reverse and remand."

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/A5B54EBBA680B571882574B0004F2EFA/$file/0755535.pdf?openelement